Mont St Quentin / Peronne 30th August -2 September 1918

Peronne / Mont St Quentin, France

"perhaps the greatest military achievement of the war....."  General Sir Henry Rawlinson Commander British 4th Army
 Background

This battle was in effect the culminating point of the evolution of the Australian Corps from the rag tag militia which had stormed ashore at Gallipoli four years earlier, to a seasoned, well-trained professionally led force that had carried all before it since August 8th at the Battle of Amiens. 

Described as "…the greatest military achievement of the war", by General Sir Henry Rawlinson, the British Commander of  the Fourth Army to which General Sir John Monash's Australian Corps belonged, this battle more than any other exemplifies the level of capability the Australians had achieved by this late stage of the war.

In complete contrast to the static and attritional nature of trench warfare, this battle was an exemplary application of manoeuvre and battle craft at platoon and company level, executed against a well sited enemy position complemented by several major terrain obstacles; namely the Somme River and the line of the Canal du Nord, which at that stage had been largely constructed but critically, not filled with water.

The Australian Corps had advanced from the vicinity of Villers Bretonneaux and Le Hamel on the 8th August.  They had advanced on the southern side of the Somme and approached the great elbow in the river at the apex of which was the town of Peronne dominated by the heights of Mont St Quentin to the north west.  Monash had gained approval to put the 3rd Division on the northern side of the river to protect his open flank as the British III Corps advance had diverged toward Bapaume.

The senior Commander's (Rawlinson) intent had been to hold short of the formidable defences of the Mont, and to allow the British III Corps and adjacent formations to catch up and carry on the approach to the Hindenburg Line.  Monash was chaffing at this approach.  He believed the AIF needed to make an indellible mark so that it played a key role in any post war negotiations, but he was running out of time and the troops in numbers needed to do it.  

Monash was also under political pressure from Prime Minister Hughes.  Hughes was trying to play a populist line with the Australian public, by pulling  troops  out of the line and sending home all the surviving 1914/15 veterans.  With reinforcements having slowed to a trickle, and no prospect of conscription to boost the flow of reinforcements, Monash's Corps was under strength by as much as 50%, and close to exhaustion, with no let-up since August the 8th.  The Australian Corps was looking at the need to disband one Battalion in each Brigade in order to condolidate available troops into viable units and sub-units.  Additional troop withdrawals would only make this equation worse.

At the same time he (Hughes) wanted Australian battlefield achievements to stake his place at the post-war negotiating table. 

Monash could not do both.  His capacity to make the mark he sought and his Prime Minister so desperately wanted, was being eroded with every new demand made by Hughes to appease electors at home.  Monash was between the proverbial rock and a hard place.

He was about to play a very high risk game. 

The Plan

To break the dilemma he planned to attack and capture Mont St Quentin essentially off the line of march and do so before any troops were withdrawn. 

Without the benefit of tanks and with much of the artillery having been re-allocated further north, he framed his plan.

The 3rd Division was already in the north bank of the Somme.  It was tasked to protect the open left flank of the impending attack by moving to clear the Bouchavesnes spur thus securing the Corps' open (northern) flank. 

The 5th Division was to hold the southern bank and then push a force across the Somme canal and river in order to mount an attack to clear Peronne.  The holding force on the south bank, the 15th Brigade led by the redoubtable Brigadier Pompey Elliot, was to then cross the river directly into Peronne. 

The 4th Division was to be the Corps Reserve behind the 2nd Division.  The 1st Division was held in depth.

Monash briefed his plan to a sceptical Rawlinson who, under considerable pressure from Monash, and very aware that his subordinate had thus far achieved everything he set out to do, relented and let Monash proceed to execution.  The die was cast.

Geography

Dominant feature - Mont St Quentin,  3 km from Peronne to the south, 9 km from Feuillaucourt Bridge to the west where the main body of troops crossed the river.  The town of Peronne itself.  The Somme river and the parallel Somme Canal were significant obstacles.  The line of the Canal du Nord, excavated but not filled with water was also a key feature.

Location of Enemy Troops (at the start of the battle): The enemy occupied a series of trench systems including Gottlieb trench on the shoulder of the hill, and ‘Brasso’ redoubt on the slopes to the west. Trenchlines contoured the slopes and ran down across the flats to the Somme.  'Elsa'   trench lay along the line of the Feuillacourt road.  Mont St Quentin was the dominating feature on the whole German Line and Ludendorf had sent the 2nd Prussian Guards Division to hold the Mont “to the death”.

Location or direction of approach of Australian troops (at the start of the battle): 

  • A critical factor was that the Australians were well under established strength; some Companies were less than half their normal strength due to losses that had not been replaced.
  • 2nd Division was to attack from the west / north west.
  • 3rd  Division had secured the Bouchavesnes spur and village north west of the line of the Canal du Nord on 31 August.
  • On the night of 31 August 1918, 2 Div troops crossed the Somme using improvised bridging and following an artillery barrage that commenced at 05:00am, attacked Mont St Quentin from the north west. 
  • 5 Div were tasked with the capture of Peronne to the south.  The 4th and 1st Divisions were in Reserve. 

Battlefield landmarks 

  • The Mont (with quarry / crater at its summit)
  • The town of Peronne
  • The Bouchavesnes Ridge-line and spur
  • The Feuillacourt bridge on the Peronne / Bapaume road
  • The Somme river  and canal, and the line of the Canal du Nord (empty of water at the time)
  • The towns of Clery and Halle
The Battle

  • The 3rd Division had largely secured the open northern flank over the period 30/31 August.  Although the 33rd Battalion only held part of their objective, a concerted effort was made, the spur was secured and the left flank of the troops attacking Mont St Quentin was secured.

  • On the night of 31 August 1918, the Australian troops crossed the Somme and following an artillery barrage that commenced at 05:00, attacked Mont St Quentin from the north west. The 5th Bde formed up along the line of the Canal du Nord.

  • During the infantry assault, Australian soldiers had to fight uphill across open ground where they were vulnerable to attack from the German-held heights above. 

  • The 17th Battalion headed up the Brasso Redoubt, and climbed towards Gottleib Trench.  They encountered the enemy almost immediately and charged their posts, yelling at the top of their voices.  The demoralised Germans, fearing they were being attacked by a superior force, surrendered in large numbers.

  • The 20th Battalion moved up to make a bayonet charge and captured the Gottleib trench.  As the Australians reached the summit, large numbers of German soldiers were sent fleeing down the slopes. 

  • By 07:00 the troops had occupied the village of Mont St Quentin and the slope and summit of the hill.  However, the small size of their forces meant that their hold on the position was tenuous.  The reserve element of the 2nd German Guards Division, counterattacked and drove the Australians from the summit to positions just below it including the Elsa trench along the approximate line of the Feuillacourt Road.

  • In the rear, the 19th Battalion crossed the Somme at the Clery bridge, which Australian engineers had saved and repaired despite enemy barrages.   

  • On 1 September, the 6th Brigade (21st, 22nd, 23rd and 24th Battalions) took the summit on their second attempt with fighting particularly heavy around the quarry where Towner and Lowerson were to win their VCs. 

Captain James Sullivan MC and Bar MM, Officer Commanding A Company, 21st Battalion, in Elsa Trench with some of his men, immediately before going out to participate in the attack on Mont St Quentin, at 1.30 pm, on 1 September 1918. It was with this renewed assault that the enemy resistance was broken and the whole position of Mont St Quentin won.  Capt Sullivan was killed in the final AIF attack of the war at Montbehain four weeks later.

  • The 14th Brigade of the 5th Division (53rd, 54th, 55th and 56th Battalions) captured the woods north of Peronne and after pressing on during a short-lived German counter attack, took the main part of Peronne.  An attempt to pass the northern side of the town was stopped by heavy fire from the ramparts. 

Soldiers from a machine-gun position established in the fighting in the ruins of Péronne, photographed on 2 September 1918." AWME03183 An Australian Lewis gun detachment cover a street in Peronne after the 5th Division captured it on 2/3 September 1918. Two of the men appear to be holding Mills bomb grenades.

  • On 2 September the 7th Brigade (25th, 26th, 27th and 28th battalions) drove through beyond the mount, the 15th Brigade (57th, 58th, 59th and 60th Battalions) seized the remainder of Peronne and the 3rd Division advanced on the northern flank. 

  • By the evening of the 3 September, the Australians held Peronne.  They captured Flamicourt the next day and then advanced three kilometres to the east on the 5th

Summary and Conclusion

This battle represented the culminating point of the Australian Corps on the Western Front.  A deliberate Corps attack, it was executed with amazing speed and alacrity.  The Battle procedure involved to adjust the initial plan and then to manouevre the three key Divisions into position across a major terrain obstacle and in the final stages under observation and fire from the enemy is an undertaking of a scale that the Australian Army has not done before or  since.

Some commentators appear determined to be-little the achievement or undermine Monash, have made various observations that are trite and fail to grasp the complexity of the operation.  Some have declared that the German Army was in effect collapsing at this point,  overlook the fact that it was still operating effectively along the line of the Front and inflicting grievous casualties on the advancing Allies.  The AMericans for example sustained 53,000 killed in little more than six months in this last phase of the war.

The AIF itself was nearing the point of exhaustion.  Grossly under strengh and well under the 3:1 ratio of attackers to defenders that normally predicate success in attack, they still managed to wrest control of the objective from the enemy with no tanks or the level of artillery support they had enjoyed in early August.

Some criticise Monash for not 'directing the attacks' of the Brigades and Battalions.  He was the Corps Commander and once battle had been joined his capacity to influence the outcome other than by positiong resources to afford the best chance of success, his role at 'the sharp end was necessarily limited by the fact that he had three Divisions in close contact with the enemy.  The fighting was conducted at Platoon and Company level and the gains were hard won.  As always, audacious and determined action by a few individuals often inspired their comrades at critical times.

The fact that the 5th Brigade was forced off the Mont on the first day by German counter-attacks, or the fact that the 6th Brigade needed two attempts to wrest the objective from the enemy do not signify failure or demean the level of accomplishment as is inferrred by some.  Rather it exemplfies the depth in attack they were able to generate, and the focus on achieveing their aim that they adhered to doggedly, despite low numbers and further casualties.  Further, the determination with which it was carried was eblematic of what determined, experienced, well trained, well led and highly motivated troops can achieve.  Resilience was, as was so often the case, exemplified by the capacity of privates and Corporals to step up and assume tactical conmmand when more senior leaders became casualties.  This in an Army that had been rank amateurs just four years previously when landed on Gallioli's fatal shore.  They had evolved into an outstanding professional organisation at every level, demonstrating great tactical flair, initiative and determination.

Experienced soldiers and leaders,  when familiarised with the detail of this battle, are generally in awe of the men at all levels who delivered this result.  And so they should be.

It came at a cost though, and the AIF's capacity to continue was being run down.  Just one month later it would fight its last battle, having breached the Hindenburg Line, at Montbrehain, so closing a tract of history that made an enduring indelible mark on Australian society and its national identity.

Postscript

In recent years it has been established that many of the remarkable images by originally unatributed photographers, were in fact captured by the redoubtable Captain (later Sir) Hubert Wilkins MC*. 

This battle formed the basis of the very popular dioramas that became a feature of the Australian War Memorial.  Execured by Charles Webb-Gilbert, he was also responsible for a number of public sculptures including the somewaht controversial 2 Division Memoriaol, depicting a hatless Australian soldier bayonetting the German eagle (removed and destroyed by the invading Germans in 1940) "the bomber" in Broken Hill, and the Rose Park Memorial in Adelaide.  The twice life size figure of the latter is derived from one that features in the Mont St Quentin diorama at the AWM.

A total of eight Victoria Crosses were awarded in this battle and its immediate aftermath

Based on original work by an esteemed colleague, the late Lieutenant Colonel Peter Morrissey

Steve Larkins

Edited and Updated Sep 2019